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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DORIS CYPERT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, SHELDON B. JOHNSON, FINDLY M. JUDD, FRED~JRICK R. BRUECK, GARY T.
MOORE, DR. \V ALTER H. SNOW,
RONALD V. McARTHUR and T.
LAVOY ESPLIN,
Def enda,nts and Appellwnts.

Case No.

12071

AP'P'ELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent, a
resident qualified voter of Washington County, Utah,
brought on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons residing within the boundaries of Washington County School District, Utah, who did not pay a tax
on property located in Washington County School District within the twelve months preceding May 27, 1969,
against the Board of Educ a ti on of Washington County
School District to enjoin the issuance of certain school
1
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building bonds voted at a bond election held and co 11 •
ducted by the Defendants-Appellants on May 27 1969
'
'
and to declare invalid those portions of Article XIV
'
Section 3, of the Utah Constitution and Sections 11-14-2
and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
which might limit the right to vote at bond elections to
those electors who have paid a property tax therein during the twelve months preceding the election.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After trial of the cause on December 12, 1969, the
District Court of Washington County, after entering a
memorandum decision on April 2, 1970, entered a judgment and decree on April 14, 1970, (1) enjoining Defendants-Appellants from issuing or selling the bonds
voted at the May 27, 1969, bond election, (2) declaring
those portions of Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Sections 11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which limit the right to vote
at bond elections to electors who had paid property taxes
on property located in the political subdivision within
twelve months preceding the date of the bond election
to be void and in violation of the United States Constitution, ( 3) declaring that the aforesaid provisions of
Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Sections
11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, requiring such taxpayer vote are severable
from the remainder of such sections and that DefendantsAppellants may validly hold bond elections as long as the
right to vote is not limited to taxpayers only, and ( 4) that
such decision would apply prospectively only aud would
2
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not affect the validity of any bond election or bonds
where the bond election contest period provided by Utah
law had expired prior to .June 16, 1969.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of so much of
the judgment of the District Court of Washington
County as enjoins Defendants from selling or issuing
the honds voted at the May 27, 1969, election and deC'lares that portion of the Constitution and statutes of
the State of Utah which limit the right to vote at bond
\'lections to those qualified electors who had paid a tax
on property located within a political subdivision within
twelve months of the date of the election to be unconstitutional and void, but respectfully asks that if this Court
affirms the judgment of the District Court of Washington County on such counts, then this court affirm the
portions of the judgment holding the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution and statutes of the State of
l'tah to be severable and permitting elections to be held
as long as the right to vote is not limited to taxpayers
only and further affirm the portion of the judgment
holding that any such decision applies prospectively
only.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent is a resident of Washington
County, Utah, and as such, a resident of Washington
County School District. She is a qualified, registered
rlector of the County, but, during the twelve month

3
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period immediately preceding May 27, 1969, did not own
property located within the boundaries of Washington
County School District, the title to which was listed in
her name on the tax rolls of Washington County, Utah,
nor did she during said twelve month period pay a property tax to Washington County or to Washington County
School District.
On April 8, 1969, the Defendants-Appellants adopted a resolution (See Exhibit A, R.12), calling a special
bond election to be held in Washington County School
District, Utah, during legal hours on May 27, 1969, upon
the issuance of bonds in the amount of $1,000,000, to
mature serially in not more than twenty years from their
date, and to bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding 6% per annum, for the purpose of raising money
for purchasing school sites, for building or purchasing
one or more school houses and supplying the same with
furniture and necessary apparatus, and for improving
school property under the charge of the Board of
Education.
By the terms of the resolution of April 8, 1969 and
the notice of election set forth in the resolution and in
accordance with the provisions of Article XIV, Section
3, Utah Constitution and of Sections 11-14-2 and 11-14-5,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Defendants-Appellants
provided that only such qualified electors of the Washington County School District as had paid a property
tax in the school district within the twelve months preceding the date of the special bond election would be permitted to cast a ballot at such election on the proposition
4
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of the issuance of such bonds. Defendants-Appellants
provided in said notice of election that qualified, registered electors of the school district presenting themselves at the polls at the special bond election on May
27, 1969, could establish that they paid a property tax
on property situated within the boundaries of the said
school district during the hvelve months immediately
preceding the date of the election either by exhibiting a
receipt of the County Treasurer of Washington County,
rtah, (in the form of a tax notice appropriately stamped
by the County Treasurer to show payment of such tax)
or, in the alternative, by taking an oath, with or without
legal challenge, under the pains and penalties of perjury,
that i:-mch person offering to vote at the bond election
had within twelve months preceding May 27, 1969, paid
a tax on property located in the school district the title
to which was held in his name according to the assessment roll of Washington County, Utah, in the form in
which said oath was set out at length in Section 9 of the
aforesaid resolution of April 8, 1969. The election on
Jfay 27, 1969 was, in fact, conducted in accordance with
these limitations. (See section 3 of Exhibit D, Resolution
Canvassing Vote of June 3, 1969; Finding of Fact 3,
H.89-90).
Plaintiff-Respondent was unable to comply with the
limitations on voting established by the Board of Education. She could not legally and properly execute the taxpaypr oath and could not present evidence of payment
of the required tax. Accordingly, Plaintiff-Respondent
dicl not vote at the special bond election (Tr. 6).
5
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The special bond election was held on May 27, 196~1
and on June 3, 1969 the returns were canvassed by the
Defendants-Appellants. (See Exhibit D, Finding of Fact
7, R. 90-91). It was determined that a majority of the
persons voting at such special bond election voted in favor
of the issuance of $1,000,000 general obligation school
building bonds of the school district. The Defendants-Appellants found that only qualified registered electors of
the Washington County School District who had paid a
property tax therein in the twelve months preceding the
election were permitted to vote at the election.
On September 22, 1969 the Defendants-AppellantR
adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance of $400,000
School Building Bonds, Series of December 1, 1969, of
the Board of Education of Washington County School
District, being part of the $1,000,000 bonds authorized
at the May 27, 1969, special bond election. (See Exhibit
B, R. 29-40; Finding of Fact 8, R. 91). In Section 7 of
said resolution of September 22, the Def endants-Appellants authorized and directed the Clerk of the Board
of Education to contact potential purchasers of the $400,000 bonds therein authorized, and to supply all necessary
information to such potential purchasers so that bids for
the sale of the bonds could be submitted to the defendant
Board of Education for consideration and acceptance.
On June 16, 1969, subsequent to the special bond
election held in Washington County School District and
conducted by the Defendants-Appellants, and subsequent
to the canvass of the results of said special bond election.

6
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but prior to the expiration of the forty-day period computed from the date the returns of the election are cannissed and the results thereof declared within which
Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, permits
rlection contests to be filed challenging bond elections,
t]JP United States Supreme Court handed down opinions
in two cases relating to the validity, under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, of state restrictions
on qualifications to vote at certain local elections. The
two cases decided on June 16, 1969, are Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 23 L. Ed.2d 583, 89
S.Ct. 1886 (1969), and Cipria!Ylo v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701, 23 L.Ed. 2d 647, 89 S.Ct. 1897 (1969). In both
cases the Supreme Court of the United States held certain state statutes which restricted the right to vote at
the local elections involved to qualified electors who also
qualified as the owners of property upon which ad valorem taxes were paid, to be in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
The Kramer case, dealt with the right to vote at
school elections generally, but the Cipriano case dealt
with the right to vote at an election held upon the question of the issuance of municipal electric utility revenue
bonds.
In the Cipriano case the Supreme Court of the
Fnited States, after holding the provisions of Louisiana
law which limit the right to vote at revenue bond elections to qualified, taxpaying electors to be in violation
7
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of the Federal Constitution, and hence the election at
which the bonds in question were approved to be invalid
'
null and void, nevertheless specified that its decision
would not be fully retroactive. The pertinent portion
of the language of the court at page 652 discussing the
prospective nature of its opinion is quoted as follows:
Significant hardships would be imposed on
cities, bondholders, and others connected with
municipal utilities if our decision today were
given full retroactive effect. Where a decision of
this Court could produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample
basis in our cases for avoiding the "injustice or
hardship'' by a holding of nonretroactivity. Great
Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Cu.,
287 U.S. 358, 364, 77 L.Ed. 360, 366, 53 S. Ct. 145,
85 A.L.R. 254 (1932). See Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 84 L.E<l.
329, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940). Cf. Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed. 2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965).
Therefore, we will apply our decision in this casP
prospectively. That is, we will apply it only where,
under state law, the time for challenging the
election results has not expired, or in cases
brought within the time specified by state law for
challenging the election and which are not yet
final. Thus, the decision will not apply where the
authorization to issue the securities is legally
complete on the date of this decision. Of cours:,
our decision will not affect the validity of securities which have been sold or issued prior to this
decision and pursuant to such final authorization.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 11-14-12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the period for bringing an election
contest under Utah law challenging the results and

8
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validity of the May 27, 1969, special bond election conducted by Defendants-Appellants expired on July 14,
1%9. The Plaintiff-Respondent suing on behalf of herself
and all other similarly situated persons who are residents of Washington County School District, but who
did not own property located within the boundaries of
the "\Vashington County School District on which they
had paid a tax within twelve months of the May 27,
1969, election held and conducted by Def endants-Appellants, filed suit against the Defendants-Appellants on
December 4, 1969, which date was after the expiration
of the 40-day bond election contest period provided in
the Utah Municipal Bond Act by Section 11-14-12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS TO GENERAL OBLIGATION
BOND ELECTIONS THE TAXPAYER VOTING REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE XIV,
SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND OF SECTIONS 11-14-2 AND 11-145, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS
AMENDED, VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
It is submitted that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
Pnited States, as recently interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Kramer and CipriMw, does
9
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not support the holding by the court below that Articlr
XIV, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution and Section~
11-14-2 and 11-14-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, which require a taxpayer vote on the question
of incurring indebtedness, are unconstitutional as applied to general obligation bond elections. The Kramer
and Cipriano opinions were not concerned with elections
on the issuance of general obligation bonds. Kramer was
wholly unrelated to the issuance of bonds and Cipriano
was concerned only with the issuance of revenue bonds,
and they are therefore not authority for invalidating the
provisions of the Utah Constitution and statutes which
require that only property taxpaying electors may vote
at general obligation bond elections.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the
Cipriano opinion was very careful to limit its opinion
to the revenue bond situation, the Court declaring in
Footnote 5 at page 651 :
As in Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15,
U.S.
, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct.
, we find it unnecessary to decide whether a
state might, in some circumstances, limit the
franchise to those "primarily interested."

It is apparent therefore that the Supreme Court of
the United States went out of its way in the Cipriano
opinion to indicate that its decision was not to be applied
to types of bond elections other than the revenue bond
type of election before the Court in that case.
The court below was therefore in error in determining that the opinion in the Cipria!flo case is determinafo·e

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the validity of the porvisions of the Utah Constitution
and :statutes which limit the right to vote at general obligation bond elections to taxpayers. On the contrary, it
is submitted that there are ample valid constitutional
grounds for reaching the contrary result and therefore
it is requested that this Court find and hold that the
l~qnal Protection Clause is not violated by the present
yoter qualification provisions of the Utah Constitution
and statutes as applied to general obligation bond
elections.
The rationale for holding that the constitutional theory of K ra.mer and Cipria'Y/,o should not appl~· to a case involving a general obligation bond
election rests in the significant difference between
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds. While the
debt represented by the latter is payable only from the
l'C\'enues generated by the project constructed with the
bond proceeds, the debt represented by general obligation bonds is legally payable from taxes levied only upon
property owners. Section 11-14-19 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides that all bonds
not payable solely from revenues constitute full general
obligations to which the full faith and credit of the political subdivision is pledged, and further provides that
such bonds enjoy an obligation on the part of the issuing
entity to levy and collect annually ad valorem taxes without limitation as to rate or amount fully sufficient for the
purpose. Furthermore, it is provided in Sections 59-10-3
aud 59-10-42 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
that taxes are made a lien on the property of a taxpayer
and that such lieu may be foreclosed upon for the pur11
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pose of collecting delinquent taxes. Therefore, through
the obligor on a general obligation bond may nominally
be the issuing entity, in effect it is a composite of the
property taxpayers who, because of their ownership of
property, can be taxed for the entire payment of the
principal and interest on the bonds. Failure to pay the
tax can lead to the loss of the property. It is these facts
which provide the very critical difference between the
nature of the general obligation bonds involved in this
appeal and those voted at the revenue bond electoin contested in Cipriano, and it is because of this difference that
the Defendants-Appellants seek to have this Court reverse the court below and hold constitutional the property taxpayer requirements of Utah law.
When disallowing the limitation of the franchise in
revenue bond elections in the Cipriano case, the United
States Supreme Court itself emphasized the significance
of this difference between revenue and general obligation bonds. In reaching the conclusion that the benefits
and burdens of a revenue bond issue fall indiscriminately
on both property owners and non-property owners alike,
the Court emphasized that this conclusion was reached
because, inter-alia, of the fundamental characteristics
of revenue bonds. The language of the Court at page
651 is as follows :
The revenue bonds are to be paid only from
the operations of the utilities; they are not financed in any way by property tax revenue. Prop~r:ty
owners, like non-property owners, use the utilities
and pay the rates ; however, the impact on them
is unconnected to their status as property taxpayers.

12
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,

By using this approach to demonstrate the irrationality
of the state's determination that property taxpayers are
more greatly affected by the issuance of revenue bonds
than are non-property taxpayers, the United States
Supreme Court distinguished bonds ''financed'' by property tax revenues from the effect of its holding. In making this distinction the Court indirectly, yet clearly,
Rustained the viability of the property taxpayer requirement in general obligation bond elections; and, therefore,
it must be said that if the Cipriano decision concerns
general obligation bond elections at all, it tends to enforce rather than deny the validity of the property taxpayer requirement in such elections.
In Cipriano, the United States Supreme Court allud0d to the Kramer case saying that in Kramer it had stated that "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest" in determining the constitutionality of a state
statute which grants the right to vote in a limited purpose election to some otherwise qualified voters and
denies it to others. As a guideline or test to be used in
determining whether or not the compelling state interest
exists, the Court explained that an examination must be
made as to whether or not those otherwise qualified
Yoters who are excluded are ''in fact substantially less
interested or affected than those the statute includes.''
In determining the unconstitutionality of the property
taxpayer requirement in revenue bond elections the Court
noted that the exclusion of non-property taxpayers could
not withstand the scrutiny of this examination, but to
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make this determination the Court did, as already mentioned, distinguish general obligation bonds. In effect,
through its reasoning in the Cipriano case, the Unit!'J
States Supreme Court seems to haYe answered the \ery
question presented in the case at hand.
\Yhile it may be conceded that the benefits reaped
from the issuance of general obligation school bonds fall
indiscriminately upon all residents of the community,
both property taxpayers and non-property taxpayers
alike, legally the burden falls entirely upon those taxpayers who will pronde the funds for the payment of
the principal of and the interest on the bonds. While
non-property tax-payers may haYe a subjectin "interest'' in the issuance of general obligation bonds, it
must be said that because they haYe no pa1i in the payment of principal and interest on these bonds they are
•' substautiall~- less interested or affected·· than the
propert~- taxpayers who legally carry the entire burden
of repayment of the bond issue together with interest
thereon.
\Yhen a public project is financed with rewnue
bonds. such as the utility system with which the Court
was concerned in Cip1·ia110. all residents of the community
are burdened and benefited irrespecfr1,·e of their o"nership of property. ~\s the Court mentioned in Cipriani'.
the burden might be in the t\wrn of increased. rate:S if
the bonds :.u-e Yoted and the benefit might be in the form
of an addition to the funds of the general CtJffers of the
eity if the utility s~·stern should generate a profit after
the payment of debt sen·ice on the bonds and other ex1-1
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of operation. Further benefit could accrue to all
i>t>l':rnse of better utility sernce resulting from the ex, t'illitnre of the bond proceeds. But what the Court was
Li': faced with in Cipriano, but which does exist in this
J~'peal. is the O\erwhelming burden placed upon propcrt:· taxpayers by rtah law if the bonds are issued, com:'<Hed with the fact that the law places no comparable
:.;11\ll'n upon non-property taxpayers. While both prop,r':- taxpayers and non-property taxpayers can benefit
• i ,1m new public projects financed with general obligar:(,L bonds, it is the property taxpayers solely who are
iei:ally required to pay the costs of financing those
!'J'<:)jects.
lft:DSt'S

Though the Plaintiff-Respondent argues that she
:1•0 will in some minimal degree share in payment of the
,.l,:'t:' of debt ser\ice on the bonds because of the fact that
'De pay::; other taxes (such as sales taxes) to the state,
<ilid the Legislature deposits some of these taxes in the
~'ate school fund and ultimately these are distributed
:c1school districts, neYertheless the Legislature ordering
·i:e collection and distribution of these taxes is one com!11,sed of representatiYes elected by all qualified \Oters.
;,,,,h property taxpayers and non-property taxpayers
a'.ikP. It cannot, therefore, be said that by \oting for the
:~rnance of general obligation school bonds. the property
:a:s:payers in the school district haYe imposed a burden
,i;_ persons who pay no taxes on property within tht'
'cl:ool district. The burden on such non-taxpayers is not
:!1e burden of tax le\·ies to repay the bond issue but is
:'...e burden of a general tax impost'd by a body of repre,.:.nati ,·es elected by all qualified Yoters.
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\Vith full knowledge that the entire burden of a
general obligation bond issue would fall solely upo1J
property taxpayers, the framers of the Utah Constitution and the members of the Utah Legislature must be
said to have had a constitutionally valid compelling interest for limiting the franchise to property taxpayers
in general obligation bond elections. This is the objectin
of the state policy, and it is clear that the voting classification chosen is necessary to attain this objective.
Harper v. Virginia, State Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966) is related
to the case at hand because in its most general sense it
concerns the payment of moneys as a prerequisite to voting. In Harper the United States Supreme Court concluded "that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard.''

What was before the Court in Harper was a poll tax,
the enforcement of which took the form of disenfranchisement of those who did not pay it. The payment of
the tax was unrelated to the matter being voted upon at
the election. "\Vhile the money to be paid in Harper was
in the nature of a fee, the property taxpayer requirement
in a general obligation bond election exists for the purpose of limiting the vote to those electors who will remain legally liable to provide the funds for the payment
of the bonds. This certainly could not be considered a
fee paid for voting. The payment of taxes is to be made
16
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irrespective of whether or not an election is pending. The
Court in Harper emphasized that" [t]o introduce wealth
or payment of a fee as measure of a voter's qualification
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor." This
was the situation in Harper. But when a case does arise,
like Cipria1z.o, in which the precondition to voting is a
relevant factor to the classification, in which the precondition is not at all capricious, the Harper ruling would
Hot apply to it. This can be seen in the language of the
Cipria;no decision. An examination of that decision indicates that nowhere does the Court speak in the sweeping language of Harper about the payment of moneys as
a prerequisite to voting being conclusively a violation of
the equal protection clause. To the contrary the Court
initially recognized the inapplicability of such an approach and as heretofore pointed out in this brief assumed arguendo that in some circumstances a state might
limit the franchise to ''specially interested'' qualified
roters. Assuming then, that such a limitation could be
made, the Court explained that whether or not equal
protection was denied those excluded from voting depended upon whether or not they were substantially less
i11terested or affected than those included. It must be
~aid, therefore, that in a case such as Cipriano, or the
case before this Court, the broad language of Harper is
inapplicable. What is applicable is the test of whether
or not those excluded from voting were substantially
less interested or affected than those included, and the
result of that test, as already discussed, must be a determination that those excluded were indeed less interested or affected.
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Since the date of the Cipriarn.o decision, there hay 1
been several decisions rendered by both federal and state
courts on the applicability of the opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Kramer and Cipriarno to
the constitutionality of property taxpayer qualifications.
At this writing, all of such decisions have not been offi.
cially reported and by stipulation by counsel concurrently
with the filing of this brief there have been filed with
the Court copies of the opinions cited in this brief as
to which official citations are not yet available so that
the Court might examine the texts of those opinions.
There is presently pending in the United States
Supreme Court the case of City of Phoenix, Arizona, el
al v. Emily Kolodziejski, No. 1066, October Term 1969,
argued orally on March 31, 1970, and which is on appeal
from a decision of the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, rendered on December 17, 1969,
________ F, Supp. -------------------- (1969). In the Phoenix case, a
three judge federal court enjoined the issuance of certain
general obligation and revenue bonds voted at an election
held in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, on June 10, 1969,
at which only real property taxpayers were permitted
to participate, on the ground that such election was held
and conducted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The federal court treated the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Cipriano as controlling as to
both general obligation and revenue bonds and simply
stated that it could find "no evidence which would justify
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a distiuction between revenue bonds and general obligation bonds.''
The Phoenix case was submitted to the United States
Supreme Court by both parties on the theory that Arizona law does not contain an election contest provision
of the nature referred to and relied upon in the opinion
handed down in the Cipriarno case, which as will be demonstrated in Point II of this brief is a significant difference
from the situation presented in this appeal.
In Stewart et al v. The Parish School Board of the
Parish of St. Charles et al, Civil No. 69-2818, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
Division, a three judge federal district court rendered
a decision on February 25, 1970, ________ F. Supp. ---------------(1970), holding that the statutes and Constitution of
the State of Louisiana which limit the right to vote at
general obligation bond elections to taxpayers to be in
Yiolation of the Equal Protection Clause o.f the Fourtrenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The Stewart decision involved a suit filed prior
to the expiration of the 60-day peremption period with
respect to the challenging of bond elections provided
under Louisiana law and the court in that case applied
its decision as to other bond elections prospectively from
the date of its opinion. Notice of the appeal of the Stewart case to the United States Supreme Court has been
filed by the defendant, Parish School Board.

On the other hand, there have been four decisions
in state courts decided since the Cipriarno decision which
19
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have sustained property taxpayer qualifications as applied to general obligation bond elections.
In Handy v. Pa.risk School Board of the Parish of
Acadia, Civil No. 3042, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
State of Louisiana, a three Judge court of appeal rendered a decision on April 30, 1970, holding that the provisions of the Louisiana constitution and statutes which
restrict the right to vote in general obligation bond elections to property taxpayers does not violate the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. In distinguishing the Phoenix case
and disagreeing with the conclusions reached in the
Stewart case, the court held that the owners of property
who by law are required to pay the indebtedness have a
''primary interest,'' as opposed to a ''remote'' or ''indirect" interest in the outcome of an election and that
there exists a ''compelling state interest'' which justifies
such constitutional and statutory provisions.
In Muench v. Paine et al, 463 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1970),
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho denied a writ
of prohibition seeking to prevent the issuance of certain
school bonds and held in a well-reasoned opinion that
the K ra.mer and Cipriano opinions did not determine the
question of the application of the constitutional doctrine
set forth in those cases to general obligation bonds. The
Idaho Supreme Court then further held that because of
the differences between bonds payable from the revenues
of a project and those payable from property taxes which
are secured by a lien on the property invoked, the nonproperty taxpayers do not have such a real and substan20
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tial interest in the outcome of the general obligation
bond election as property taxpayers have and therefore
that the non-property owners as a class are substantially
less affected by the outcome of a general obligation bond
election than are property owners.
In addition to the Muench and Handy cases, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in two cases, Settle v. Board
of County Commissioners of the County of Muskogee,
462 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1970) and Settle v. The City of
Jluskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1970), distinguished the
Jecisions of Kramer and Cipriarrw and held that the taxpayer requirement of Section 27 of Article 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution properly limits the right to vote to
those primarily interested and that the extent to which
a non-property taxpayer is interested or affected is indirect and remote.
It is submitted that the rationale adopted by the
Louisiana Court in the Handy case and by the Oklahoma
and Idaho courts holding that the Constitution of the
United States does not invalidate state constitutional
and statutory provisions which limit the right to vote at
general obligation bond elections to taxpayers should be
adopted by this Court in this appeal.
It must be recognized, however, that as interpreted
hy this Court in Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278,
28 P.2d 144 (1933) and in Wadsworth v. Santaquin, 83
Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933), Article XIV, Section 3, of
the Utah Constitution requires an election upon the issuance of revenue bonds where the revenues of an exist-
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ing public utility are to be pledged to the repayment of
the bonds and as to which revenue bond election only
property taxpayers may vote. The Cipriano deci1iion
would appear to apply to the voting of revenue bonds
under such circumstances in Utah, but it is submitted
that the judgment of the court below in holding that the
taxpayer election requirement is void and unconstitutional as applied to all bond elections, not just revenue
bond elections, is inapprop:fiate and should be reversed
by this Court on this appeal.
POINT II
THE COURT BELff\V ERRED IN ENJOINING THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS
A S T H E PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS
BARRED FROM ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE ELECTION BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 11-14-12, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
The court below improperly assumed that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cipriano
governed the disposition of the allegation of the Plaintiff-Respondent which sought to declare the provisions
of the Utah Constitution and statutes to be invalid as
limiting the right to vote at a general obligation bond
election to taxpayers. The United States Supreme Court
in the Civriano decision stated that as to revenue bonds
it would apply its decision only where under state law
the time for challenging the election result had not then
expired, or in cases brought within the time specified
by state law for clrnlle11ging the election and which were
22
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not yet final on June 16, 1969. The court below, treating
a general obligation bond election as being subject to the
prospective language of the CiprialYlo opinion, thus erroneously held that inasmuch as on June 16, 1969, the
40-day election contest period prescribed in Section 1114-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, had not expired, the
decision of the lower court dealing with the basic constitutional question of the validity of taxpayer qualifications at general obligation bond elections would apply
to the bond election of May 27, 1969. It is submitted that
this is erroneous, that as demonstrated in Point I of this
brief, the United States Supreme Court has not decided
the constitutional question with respect to general obligation bonds and that it was improper for the court
below to disregard the fact that the 40-day election contest period of Section 11-14-12 had expired on July 14,
1969, months before the filing of this action on December
4, 1969, by the Plaintiff-Respondent.
Section 11-14-12 (3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
contains the following language:
''No contest shall be maintained and no bond
election shall be set aside or held invalid unless a
complaint is filed within the period prescribed in
this section.''

It is the position of the Defendants-Appellants that
it was the intention of the United States Supreme Court
in the Cipria1Jio case to deal only with revenue bonds and
that the language in the Cipriano opinion with respect
to the passage of the state contest period on June 16,
1969, cannot logically be applied to contests with respect
23
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to general obligation bond elections. It is true that liti.
gation is now pending in the United States Supremr
Court on the question of the applicability of the constitutional doctrine of the Kramer and Cipriano decisions to
general obligation bond elections, but it is nevertheles~
submitted that in such a decision if the United States
Supreme Court applies such doctrine to general obligation bonds it will undoubtedly establish a new prospective
date for the application of its opinion to general obligation bonds. Inasmuch as the Phoenix case does not involve a state election contest provision, such decision
as will be demonstrated later on will not change the fact
that as to the May 27, 1969 bond election the state contest period has expired barring Plaintiff-Respondent
from seeking to enjoin the issuance of the bonds.
Litigation arising with respect to the property taxpayer requirement in general obligation bond elections
held in the State of Louisiana both before and after the
decision in the Cipriano case should be considered by this
Court in determining whether the court below was correct in enjoining the issuance and sale of the bonds. It
is urged that on the basis of the following discussed cases
this Court should hold that the 40-day election contest
period provided by Section 11-14-12 be applied to this
litigation and that it hold that Plaintiff-Respondent is
barred from bringing an action to enJom the issuance
of the bonds.
In the case of Andrieux v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board, 227 So.2d 370 (La. 1969), suit was brought
subsequent to the passage of the 60-day contest periorl
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provided in Section 14 (n) of Article 14 of the Louisiana
Constitution questioning the validity of general obligation bonds voted at a taxpayer election held prior to
.June 16, 1969. The Louisiana Supreme Court, emphasizing that in Cipriano the United States Supreme Court
recognized that state prescriptive or peremptive provisions were valid as a bar to such attacks, held that even
though the relief sought was for an alleged deprivation
of federal constitutional rights, the suit could not be
maintained if it was filed subsequent to the 60-day period
following promulgation of the election results. Citing
the Andrieux case, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Strick Chambers v. Road District No. 505 of Tarngipahoa
Parish, Louisia!Yla, 229 So.2d 698 (La. 1969) sustained the
dismissal by a trial court of a suit challenging the legality
of a road district general obligation bond and tax election
held on June 7, 1969, on Cipriano grounds because the
litigation was not filed until after the passage of the
GO-day peremption period. An application for a writ of
eertiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court,
which application was denied by the United States Supreme Court on March 2, 1970. It is significant to note
that on February 24, 1970, the Supreme Court of the
United States noted probable jurisdiction in the Phoenix
case dealing with the application o.f Cipriano to general
obligation bonds where no defense was made under such
a state contest period.
In addition to the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court mentioned above, in Hobbs v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish, Civil Action No. 14836, United States Dis25
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trict Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division,-------- F. Supp. ------------, (1970), a three judge
federal district court on January 3, 1970, dismissed an
action contesting a Louisiana general obligation bond
election on the ground that only property taxpayers wer 8
permitted to vote, because a proper party plaintiff had
not brought the action ·within the 60-day period subsequent to the date of the promulgation of the election result as required by Louisiana law. In the Hobbs case an
improper party plaintiff (a non-taxpayer who was also
not registered to vote) originally filed the suit within
te 60-day period, and after te 60-day period had run the
court denied an attempt to substitute a plaintiff who
would have originally had standing to sue. In the decision the federal district court characterized the Louisiana 60-day period as peremptive, emphasizing that the
lapse of the prescribed period operates as a complete
extinguishment of the right to bring the action.
The fundamental notion involved here, of permitting
a state statute of limitations to apply to those rights of a
complainant acquired from federal law is one recognized
not only in the decision just mentioned by also one which
has been clearly recognized in past decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In O'Sullivan- v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914), a plaintiff who was
molested while attempting to vote at a general election
brought a civil action which arose under a federal civil
rights act. Faced with an attempt by the defendants to
dismiss the action as one against which the state prescriptive period had run, the Supreme Court made clear
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that because "the action depends upon or arises under
the laws of the United States does not preclude the application of the statute of limitations of the state ... '' and
that it was "therefore not necessary to pursue in detail
the argument of plaintiff based on the postulate that
'the Sovereign alone can limit the right of action ... ' "
(at 233 U.S. 322) Similarly, see Baker v. F & F Investment (C.C.A. 7, 1970) 420 F.2d 1191, wherein the federal
appellate court, citing 0 'Sullivan, found that an Illinois
statute of limitations could apply to rights acquired from
a federal act, the Court stating at page 1194 that "Limitations on the period within which a right may be redressed do not conflict with the existence of that right."
This same approach of applying a state prescriptive
period against federal rights has also been followed when
those rights were acquired directly from the Federal
Constitution and not merely from an act of Congress.
In Benedict v. City of New York (C.C.A. 2, 1917) 247
~~ed. 758, aff 'd 250 U.S. 321, 39 S.Ct. 476, 63 L.Ed. 1005
(1919), the complaintant was the holder of certain unpaid and overdue special assessment certificates of Long
Island City, New York, and was suing the City of New
York as the successor of Long Island City. The complainant asserted rights acquired directly from the Federal
Constitution, arguing that he had been deprived of his
property without due process of law, and that the obligation of the contract under which the certificates sued upon
were issued had been impaired by certain legislation of
the State of New York. The plaintiff argued that a. trust
in his favor had, therefore, been violated and that an
27
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accounting and liability should be due him for its breach.
It appeared from the facts that the City Treasurer had
foreclosed upon and then sold certain land securing the
assessments for an amount far less than the assessments
themselves and also that the New York Legislature, subsequent to the time of the issuance of the certificates
'
provided that lands securing the certificates could be
purchased with certificates at par value. For purposes of
reaching the defendant's statute of limitations argument,
the Court of Appeals assumed the validity of the complaint but found that it had been filed 17 years after
the cause of action had accrued. Since both the state's
six and its ten year statutes of limitations were violated,
the Court found it unnecessary to choose which of the
two was applicable to the facts, and instead merely determined that the plaintiff had delayed too long in
bringing the suit both under a statute of limitations
theory and under the equitable doctrine of !aches. Citing
0 'Sullivan, the Appellate Court stated at page 767:
In the absence of any statute of limitations
enacted by Congress, the federal courts of equity
usually follow the state statutes; and they do this
even in actions which depend upon or arise under
the laws of the United States ... The complainant
is here asserting an equitable right, and it is true
that as a general rule the equity jurisdiction of
the United States is not affected by state laws.
That principle can not be invoked however to deprive a federal equity court of the power to refuse
relief to a suitor whose right is barred by a state
statute of limitations. Such statutes are not binding upon federal courts in suits in equity, yet
those courts may and generally do apply the
statutes upon principles of analogy; and such
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statutes have been applied by these courts to
claims against trustees.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr .
.Justice Brandeis, affirmed the court below reemphasizing the significance of the state's statute of limitations
in guiding a federal court of equity faced with an action
on a. stale claim.
On the basis of the foregoing cases, especially those
decided since the Cipriano case, it is submitted that the
proper approach for this Court to take is to hold that
the Legislature of the State of Utah has concluded that
there is a compelling interest in the state to see that at
some time in the electoral process the election results
become fixed and incontestable. Purchasers of bonds
must have this assurance, and a failure of the state
judiciary to recognize the prescriptive nature of the
contest period would affect the market for municipal
securities issued by Utah political subdivisions. Therefore, it is requested that this court adopt the position
tahn by the Louisiana Supreme Court and hold that
the plaintiff had no right after July 14, 1969, to sue
to enjoin the issuance of the bonds. This result is particularly applicable and should be followed by this
Court in view of the fact that the basic constitutional
question has not been heretofore decided by the United
States Supreme Court. When the Phoenix case is decided by the Supreme Court there is no reason now
aYailable to believe that the court would in any way
hold that its decision would apply to general obligation
bond elections conducted subsequent to June 16, 1969.
If this Court should affirm the decision of the trial
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court in declaring that the constitutional and statutory
provisions limiting the right to vote at bond elections
to taxpayers does apply to general obligation bond elections, nevertheless it is submitted that this Court should
in part reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold
that since the action enjoining the issuance of the bonds
was not properly and timely brought that the bonds in
question may nevertheless be issued by the DefendantsA ppellants. There is little to distinguish this case from
the situation in the Chambers case, certiorari on which
was denied a week subsequent to the noting of jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court in the
Phoenix case, and it is urged that this court adopt as
to Utah bond elections the theory approved by the
Louisiana Supreme Court as to Louisiana bond elections
and which is fully supported by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT
IN HOLDING THAT TO THE EXTENT
ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 11-14-2
AND 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY REQUIRING A TAXPAYER VOTE AT BOND
ELECTIONS, SUCH PROVISIONS ARE
SEVERABLE AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO HOLD A
GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND ELECTION
AS LONG AS THE PROPOSITION IS NOT
LIMITED TO TAXPAYERS.
30
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If subsequent to the decision in this case the United
States Supreme Court should render a decision in the
Phoenix case holding that it is not proper to limit the
right to vote at general obligation bond elections to
taxpayers only or if this Court should affirm the decision
of the court below invalidating such provisions of Utah
law then it is respectfully requested by DefendantsAppellants that this Court affirm the holding of the
court below that such provisions are severable and that
bond elections at which all qualified electors are permitted to vote may be conducted. In this connection
it is desired to call this Court's attention to the pro"isions of Senate Bill No. 3 of the 1970 Session of the
Utah Legislature, Chapter 4, Laws of Utah, 1970,
wherein the Legislature of the State of Utah set forth
as its intention and policy that if the provisions of the
Utah Constitution which limit the right to vote at a
bond election to the qualified electors of the municipality
as shall have paid a property tax therein in the year
preceding the election are removed by constitutional
amendment or are held to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States by this Court or by the
Supreme Court of the United States then it is the
PXpress intention of the Legislature that propositions
for the issuance of bonds under the Utah Municipal
Bond Act shall be submitted at an election at which
all qualified electors may vote.

1'he la\\' with respect to the maximum rate of interest
which school bonds could bear in effect at the time the
Defendants-Appellants adopted the resolution submitting
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the bond proposition at the May 27, 1969, election wa,
6% per annum. Recognizing the current high interest
rates obtaining in the municipal bond market, the Utah
Legislature has raised the maximum rate of interest
which school bonds may bear to 8%. See Senate Bill
No. 3, 1970 Session of the Utah Legislature, Chapter
4, Laws of Utah, 1970. In view of the current bond
market it is therefore entirely possible that if this Court
should hold that the court below was in error when it
enjoined the issuance of the bonds voted at the May 2i,
1969, election, nevertheless it would be impossible to sell
those bonds subject to a 6% voted interest rate. If this
were to be the case, then it would be necessary for the
Defendants-Appellants to submit a new proposition to
the voters of the school district at a higher maximum
interest rate. If a decision is reached in the Phoenix
case, or in this case, or both, which should result in
affirming the constitutional principle enunciated by the
trial court below that the provisions limiting the right
to vote to taxpayers are unconstitutional, then the
Defendants-Appellants request that this Court provide
guidance to Utah political subdivisions by affirming the
holding of the trial court that such provisions are severable and that a bond election may be legally held where
the proposition is submitted to all qualified electors, in
accordance with the policies established hy the Legislature of the State of Utah in Senate Bill No. 3, supra.
There are many other political subdivisions in the State
of Utah which face the same problems of uncertainty
which arise as to the resubmission of the bonds in this
litigation. The Legislature has attempted to do all that
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it can constitutionally do toward providing the necessary
enabling legislation prior to a resolution of the con~titutional issues raised by the Cipriano case as far as
general obliga ti on bond elections are concerned prior
to the actual decisions by this Court in this case and by
the United States Supreme Court in the pending Phoenix
ease. It is therefore respectfully requested that this
Court provide guidelines to this school district and to
other political subdivisions in the state who must undertake honding programs in order that some indication
may be had as to whether or not, absent a constitutional
amendment, authority exists for the submission of bond
propositions to all qualified electors of the political subdivision involved as to both general obligation and
revenue bond propositions if that is ultimately decided
hy the courts of this land to be constitutionally required.
Defendants-Appellants submit that the decision of
the Court below on the question of severability is correct
and that there is ample authority for a decision by this
Court that the offending parts of the Constitution have
Leen erased instanter from the Utah Constitution and
that authority exists to hold bond elections and to permit
all qualified electors to vote without the necessity of a
rorn:;titutional amendment removing the offending parts
or further enabling legislation other than contained in
Senate Bill No. 3, supra. Similar situations have arisen
in the past regarding the abolition of state constitutional
provisions required by United States constitutional
amendments or interpretations of the courts. In People
1'· Hulmes, 173 N.E. 145
(Ill. 1930), the Nineteenth
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Amendment to the Constitution permitting women thl'
right to vote was held by its own force to supersede ali
inconsistent state and federal provisions without questioning the right of elections to be conducted permitting
all qualified voters the right to vote. The Mississippi
Supreme Court in Ratcliff v. Board of Supervisors, 193
So.2d 137 (Miss. 1966), held that the judicial invalidation
of the Poll Tax by the United States Supreme Court as
a qualification of voting had only the effect of writing
out of the state constitution such requirement.
In order to prevent a further delay in the financing
of needed public facilities, it is requested that this Court
answer this question and affirm the holding of the court
below that valid bond elections may now be conducted
in the State of Utah at which all qualified electors may
vote if by action of this Court or by action of the Supreme
Court of the United States provisions in the Utah Constitution and statutes limiting the right to vote to taxpayers are declared to be unconstitutional.
POINT IV
ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT WITH
RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE
BONDS SHOULD BE MADE PROSPECTIVE
ONLY.
In the Cipriano case as noted in Point II, siipra, the
United States Supreme Court recognized the necessity
of making its decision with respect to revenue bonds
prospective so as not to affect the validity of outstarnl-
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•
ing bonds. Likewise, if this Court should find that the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State
of Utah violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
then in order to protect the credit of the various political
subdivisions of the State of Utah and to prevent the
casting of doubt on the validity of outstanding bonds
issued by those political subdivisions it is respectfully
requested that this Court, following the Cipriano decision
and the court below, apply its decision in this case
prospectively only. As in the Cipriano opinion the technique of making decisions prospective only has been
adopted in recent years by various courts including this
Court in Carter v. Bea.ver County Service .Area No. One,
16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P .2d 440 (1965). A leading case
decided by the United States Supreme Court is Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.
287 U.S. 358 (1932) commented on in Schaefer, The Control of ''Sunbursts'': Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631 (1967). This decision has
been followed in many areas in addition to the Cipriano
case, notably in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
A state decision discussing this problem is the Washington Supreme Court decision in State v. Martin, 284 P.2d
833 (Wash. 1963) where the court overruled one of its
prior decisions with respect to constitutional doctrine
hut provided that the opinion would be applied prospectively only with respect to outstanding bonds which
had been issued under the prior construction of the
constitution.
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The court below held that its decision would apply
only to bond elections where the contest period provided
by Utah law had not expired on June 16, 1969. As has
been argued in this brief, this Court should hold that
the Cipriano date does not govern the validity of general
obligation bond elections and therefore this Court should
feel free to apply a new prospective date to the validity
of bond elections. If the Supreme Court of the United
States should decide this question by affirming the
decision of the trial court in the Phoenix case and fix
a new prospective date, that date would of course govern
the validity of bonds and of bond elections in Utah.
However, in absence of such a decision, it is requested
that this Court make clear that it is the date of its
decision rather than June 16, 1969, which governs the
validity of general obligation bond elections and that
its decision will be applied prospectively only. As to
bonds which have been issued and are in the hands of
holders, it is requested that this Court specifically state
that any opinion or decision in this case affirming the
trial court will not affect such bonds which have been
actually issued and delivered prior to the date of such
opm10n.
CONCLUSION
Defendants-Appellants are faced with the need of
obtaining the financing of additional school facilities
through the issuance of school building bonds in order
to provide the capital funds to pay the cost of such
construction. It is requested that this Court reverse
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the decision of the court below to the extent that it
enjoins the issuance of the bonds by the DefendantsAppellants voted at the May 27, 1969, election. As has
been argued in this brief, it is submitted that irrespective
of the constitutional doctrines of the Cipriano, Kramer
and Harper decisions and whatever may be adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in the pending
Phoenix case, the passage of the 40-day election contest
period provided by Utah law without challenge to the
rnlidity of the bond election prevents any inquiry at
this time into the validity of the bonds voted at the
jfay 27, 1969, election and that as to such election there
can be no constitutional question raised under state law.
It is requested that this Court hold that any invalid
provisions of the statutes and Constitution are severable
and in such event that if necessary in order to sell the
bonds voted at the May 27, 1969, election, a new election
may be conducted in the Washington County School
District at which all qualified electors may vote.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN ,V. PALMER
Attorn,ey for AppeUoots
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